Introduction
In recent decades, China has emerged as a main player in international trade. Seizing the opportunity of fast development caused by reform of the economic regime and tapping into the process of globalization (Yao 2010), China's economic ties with both the United States and other East Asian economies have become progressively closer, and it has become a more and more important member of the US-dominated global economic system. As a result of this process, China has started to play an increasingly important role in the East Asian and the world economies.
What is the role of China in the East Asian economy? Answers to this question differ. From the trade perspective, some studies argue that the fast growth of China's exports has posed a threat to other East Asian economies (Weiss and Gao 2003) , whereas others point out that, although the other East Asian economies appear to have lost out to Chinese exports in the global market, this loss has been balanced by substantial increases in exports of components to China itself (Ravenhill 2006) and that the expansion of China's economy will open unprecedented market opportunities for the region's exporters (RolandHolst 2012) . Other analysts adopt an ambivalent stance; these scholars argue that China's and Asia's emerging economies are both comrades and competitors in trade (Ahearne et al. 2003) . Although on one hand, one can observe a ''crowding-out'' effect of China's exports, on the other hand, the nature of the international production system leads to complementarity rather than confrontation between China and emerging Asian economies (Lall and Albaladejo 2004) .
In fact, all of these arguments express some aspects of the truth. China's role has changed greatly as part of the process of its economic integration with the East Asian economy as a whole and will continue to change in the future. In the past three decades, China progressed from following the Japan-led ''flying geese'' paradigm to becoming the main assembler of the whole region (Li and Ding 2007) . It then began to absorb more diversified products produced in the region and is now trying to be a more vital and positive player in the regional economy by, for instance, becoming a main market for final consumer goods of the regional production networks, and thus to some extent taking over the former role of the United States. However, as China became an uppermiddle-income country in 2010, new challenges emerged, and both China's economic ''new normal'' and its emphasis on the ''middle-income trap'' revealed that there would be more uncertainties in China's future economic development. These uncertainties will also influence China's external economic relations and its future role in the East Asian and world economies.
This article investigates China's changing role in the regional trade networks and its policy implications for China and the East Asian economy. We first review the process by which China emerged as the regional export platform of East Asia and the driving forces behind this emergence. Second, we argue that China's status as a regional assembler is still risky and not ideal for either China or its neighbours at the current stage. China could have and already has made efforts to provide a market for the region's consumer goods. We examine the factors affecting this process. Third, we also explore the uncertainties that China will encounter in the process of structurally changing its domestic economy and foreign trade. Finally, we conclude by discussing the policy implications of our findings.
From a Following Goose to a Regional Assembler
China began to reopen itself to the world at the end of the 1970s. Since then, the scale and structure of China's foreign economic relations have changed dramatically. At the beginning, China was merely an exporter of typical labour-intensive products and even natural resources. 1 It played the characteristic role of an economic newcomer, a ''following goose'' according to the traditional ''flying geese'' paradigm in East Asia, where Japan was then taking the economic lead.
For a long time, this flying geese paradigm and the industrial connections and trade development of Asian economies have been characterized by the fact that developing Asian economies have primarily brought in capital, technologies, and components from the most developed country in the region (Japan) for processing and assembly and then exported them to developed nations outside of the region, principally the United States. Accordingly, a special triangular trade pattern has existed in East Asia: The industrialization and economic development of emerging Asian economies depended on imports of capital goods and foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows from Japan (Kojima 1978) , and their products were exported mainly to the United States, so they had a surplus vis-à-vis the United States and a deficit vis-à-vis Japan.
Two key factors have driven the flying geese paradigm. One is that the pattern of division of labour in the region changed from interindustry vertical specialization to intraindustry vertical specialization, or production fragmentation, caused by the further development of globalization and rapidly growing intraindustry trade. This has led to a sharp rise in trade in intermediate goods among Asian economies, but the European Union, Japan, and the United States remain the main export markets for final goods (Zebregs 2004) . The other key factor is that, through further measures of economic reforms and opening up, China's greatly increased production capacity could merge with the global markets and regional production networks. Meanwhile, multinational corporations from the other East Asian economies invest more and more in manufacturing industries, especially in the processing and assembling sectors in China.
Thus, since the mid-1990s a new triangular trade pattern has emerged. On the one hand, both Japan and the other emerging Asian economies invest in and export capital goods, including final capital goods and components, to China; on the other hand, China exports more and more to the traditional markets of other Asian economies. As a result, China has to some extent become a substitute for Japan and emerging Asian economies as the most important source of US imports, and in this process, rapid export growth since the 1990s had significantly upgraded the technological structure of China's manufactured exports (Yu and Hu 2015) .
China's greater penetration of international markets was accompanied by a surge in China's imports from all regions-especially Asia (Lall 2000) . The result was a new triangular trade in which all other Asian economies export to China and, overall, develop a surplus vis-à-vis China, and China develops an ever increasing surplus vis-à-vis the United States. In this new regional triangular trade, China, not Japan, plays an increasingly central role. This means the increase in China's exports to markets outside of the region will improve other Asian economies' S46 Ding and Li exports to China (Rumbaugh and Blancher 2004) . The Asian economies can compensate for the decrease in their shares in other markets with a bigger Chinese market. The larger China's surplus is with respect to the United States, the larger the surplus of other Asian economies will be with respect to China. Thus, the growth of China's exports will not pose a threat to but will rather be a positive factor for Asian economies' trade and economic growth. Figure 1 In this process, several factors may have played significant roles. First, as mentioned, the multinational corporations and FDI inflows from other East Asian economies may have been a very important driving force of the process. As can be seen in Figure 2 , the increase of FDI inflows from Japan and the other East Asian economies have a similar trend with the development of the triangular trade. Second, changes in the quantity and quality of China's labour force may also have played an important role. In addition, general economic development and improvement in infrastructure could also have had some positive effects on the process.
To investigate the effects of the FDI inflows by source and other factors, we use provincial data on China's exports (by Harmonized System four-digit code) and FDI inflows by source to empirically study the driving forces of the export of different kinds of commodities. Following Lall (2000) Because exports in previous periods might affect current exports, we introduce the lagged value of the dependent variable as an explanatory variable while using a dynamic panel data model to deal with the potential endogeneity problem. For the model, we also add FDI and economic development variables with a one-year lag. The baseline regression model in our empirical investigation is specified as follows:
where y it denotes the dependent variable, x it denotes lagged FDI and other control variables, g i denotes unobservable province fixed effects, and e it is an error term. Table 1 provides definitions for and descriptions of the variables.
We use the two-step generalised method of moments to reduce the small sample bias, and the estimation passed the Sagan test and the second-order autoregressive test (see Table 2 ) and fit the robustness requirement. Table 2 reports regression results. We can see that the FDI inflows from Asian newly industrialised economies have a statistically significant positive effect on China's export of MT and HT manufactures; the FDI inflows from Japan promote China's export of HT manufactures and have a negative effect on China's export of MT It should be noted that most of China's exports in the HT category are electronics and electrical products, which, according to Lall (2000) , are labour-intensiveassembly final products. Their high value-to-weight ratios make them economical to produce in low-wage countries. The positive impact of FDI from Japan on China's exports in the HT category also reflects the investment in the assembly sector. Thus, the FDI inflows from both Japan and the Asian newly industrialized economies might be mainly intraindustry vertical FDI, which certainly promotes China's export into developed markets while also promoting the triangular trade.
We can also investigate the roles of other factors. First, the labour force in the primary and secondary industries did not play a significant role in promoting the export of either MT or HT products. However, the growth of human capital or the development of higher education can play a significant positive role in promoting the export of MT products, which means that quality, not quantity, of labour force is the more important positive factor in the structural change of China's exports and change in the regional production networks. At the same time, an increase in GDP per capita is also statistically significant and positive for China's rising exports of MT products.FDI inflows into China from other East Asian economies not only increase its export of MT and HT products but also increase its imports from the investor economies because the investments are mainly intra-industry vertical FDI. In this process, China has gradually begun to substitute the United States as the export market for the total exports of the Asian region, as shown in Table 3 . This change in China's role is an important positive factor both for the growth of other Asian economies and for the upgrading of their economic structure, because trade is not a zero-sum game but a way to utilize a country's comparative advantage. With or without surpluses vis-à-vis China, the other Asian economies can improve the scale of their outputs through an expanding Chinese market and can improve the efficiency of their outputs by agglomerating the processing and assembling procedures to China and producing goods for which they have comparative advantages.
China's Potential to Become a Regional Market for Final Consumer Goods
China's role as a regional assembler is beneficial to both China and other East Asian economies, but this does not mean that it has no concerns. First, although China had already previously been the hub of the East Asian production networks, its status within specialization was quite different and much less significant than that of Japan in the earlier years. This central position is actually based on China's labour force advantages. Almost half of China's exports are so-called processing and assembling exports. Because China's position in the global value chain is still relatively low (Su, Regnière, and Su 2013) , the value added that China obtained from this trade was limited. Thus, ''Made in China'' better reflects the reality than ''Made with China'' or ''Made by China.'' However, the increase in vertical specialization and trade in component production and assembling have not lessened the dependence of Asian countries on the global economy for growth. The dynamism of the Asian regional production networks still depends inexorably on China's trade in final consumer goods with North America and the European Union (Athukorala 2008) .
If China was to continue to be the regional assembler of the Asian region, the trickle down of positive effects to other Asian economies would be limited and risky, because the main markets for the final consumer goods would still be developed countries such as the United States, which are located outside of Asia. This shows that the growth of production in East Asia will depend on the economic situation outside of the region (McKinnon and Schnabl 2003) . A dependence on these export markets seems quite risky for both China and East Asia as a whole because the growth perspectives of the developed countries, particularly Europe, are not as bright as those of East Asia. Because the final consumer goods reflect the final demand, whereas market structure is closer to perfect competition with a higher substitution elasticity, the importing country or the market for final consumer goods tends to have a relatively more dominant position in the specialization and trade networks. For East Asia, this role has long been assumed by the United States, which also determines the characteristics of foreign trade patterns and the monetary system in East Asia. China can uplift regional development in case it absorbs more of the regional production of final consumer goods through an increase in its per capita income.
Another factor that also supports a change in China's role in the regional economy is the fact that a shift in the export markets of Asian economies from developed countries to China may deprive them of some added value, because China tends to import raw intermediates rather than the processed intermediates preferred by developed countries (Kaplinsky, Terheggen, and Tijaja 2011) . For a more equal distribution of the trade gains between China and the raw material exporters, it is important that China change its position as a market for intermediates (provided by some Asian economies that export natural resource-based intermediates) and capital goods to a market for final consumer goods.
Recently, the pattern of China's trade and investment has shown China's ascendance from absorbing intermediaries to being a market for consumer goods. First, there have been changes to China's trade dependency and its demand structure. To some extent, China's economic growth relies heavily on investment and trade, which is not favourable for its growth in the long run. This would be an obstacle for China in becoming a provider of markets for consumer products. China's trade dependency has increased drastically since the start of the 21st century, following China's accession into the WTO in 2001. In these years, trade was a very important driving force for China's economic growth. However, after 2006, even before the outbreak of the global financial crisis, this trade dependency began to decline. Although trade dependency has recovered to some extent since the financial crisis, the general trend of trade dependency has been in decline, with China's trade dependency reduced from 65.2 percent in 2006 to 41.5 percent in 2014, which indicates that the relative importance of domestic demand has increased. The increase in domestic demand has not significantly raised China's demand for foreign consumer goods, because the implementation of the Chinese government's expanding domestic demand strategy resulted in a rise in public investment rates rather than a significant growth in consumption rates. China could eventually become a major world market for final consumer goods if it maintains such a high relative growth rate in consumption, compared with other countries (Zhu and Zhang 2012) .
Second, in recent years, China's foreign trade structure has also experienced some changes, not only as an important feature of the traditional new triangular trade in which the surplus vis-à-vis the United States and deficits vis-à-vis other East Asian economies have narrowed or slowed down, but also because the product structure of China's foreign trade has gradually changed. It is more obvious when comparing the product structure of China's foreign trade with that of Japan and the United States. As can be seen from Table 4 , since the 1990s China's trade structure has experienced a gradual change. The proportion of final consumer goods in exports declined, whereas the proportion of capital goods and parts and components in exports increased. At the same time, the proportion of intermediate products in Chinese imports fell, while the proportion of final consumer goods in imports increased. In contrast, the product structure of trade in developed countries such as Japan and the United States is much more stable. Clearly, China is in the process of restructuring its foreign trade, and its original pattern of focusing on assembling is gradually changing, Meanwhile, the Chinese economy has shown a rise in demand for external consumer goods. Table 5 shows that the United States was absorbing around half of the Asian economies' exports of consumer goods at the end of the 1990s, whereas China's share of final consumer goods among the emerging Asian economies' exports was less than 1 percent. By 2014, China's share grew to around 8 percent in most cases, while the US share declined drastically, and Japan's share as a destination of the region's consumer goods was also reduced.
All the aforementioned factors would be helpful for China to become a main regional market for the production of consumer goods. Without further efforts in both its domestic economy and its foreign economic relations, however, it might be difficult for China to attain this. As can be seen from Tables 3 and 5 , compared with China's huge shares in the total exports of other Asian economies, its share in their exports of consumer goods is still quite small, and the growth rates of their exports of consumer goods to China are also relatively small. As shown in Table 6 , China is so far still the most important market for parts and components exports for most of the other East Asian countries. Although China's trade pattern has gradually changed, it has not fundamentally changed its role as East Asia's regional assembler. Table 4 shows that there is still an obvious gap between the trade structures of China and the United States. 
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What kinds of factors could be driving forces for China's import of final consumer goods? For this investigation, we use a similar model (using the logarithm of the total labour force instead of labour force in the primary and secondary industries) and similar samples (with data from all 30 provinces of China). The results are shown in Table 7 . Because the majority of FDI inflows into China are vertical FDI from other East Asian economies, which promote the import of capital goods and parts and components, this is a negative factor for China's import of consumer goods. Also, because China's consumption rate is always relatively low, the increase in GDP per capita and the total labour force do not have significant roles. However, both the growth of human capital and the development of infrastructure can play positive role in promoting the import of final consumer goods.
Thus, in the absence of positive exogenous shocks or policy initiatives that change the FDI flow pattern and improve the infrastructure and higher education, the endogenous process of China's transformation into a main regional market for final consumer goods might take a long time to complete. Fortunately, it seems that Chinese policy-makers have already recognized the need to take swift action to change both its domestic economic structure and its pattern of international cooperation.
China's Efforts in Domestic Reforms and International Cooperation
The Chinese authorities have provided several plans for a so-called economic transformation and upgrade. On the macro level, President Xi's idea of the economic new normal, suggested in 2014, indicates a slow down in the growth rate and an increased focus on the sustainability of growth and the transcendence of the middleincome trap. As we know from the experiences of former low-income countries, many of them could raise their GDP per capita to the level of U$5,000, but in the past two decades only two countries-South Korea and Singapore-successfully raised their GDP per capita from $US5,000 to $US20,000 (Zhang 2010) . This phenomenon, which some have called the middle-income trap, will be a big challenge for China in the years to come. If China's economy meets with critical problems in the future, it will quite difficult for China to overcome this trap. Therefore, maintaining stable and sustainable growth is of the utmost importance. This means that authorities might in the future prefer to shy away from radical methods to promote exports and attract FDI inflow because that could cause problems under current global and domestic economic situations.
The efforts made at the structural and micro levels would seem to be more relevant to the change in China's role in the international economy, where three things should be emphasized. First, China said it would carry on with its strategy to expand domestic demand, so one should expect that the policies will be oriented toward promoting or at least maintaining the level of consumption. Second, China encourages its large business groups to become world-class companies. It should be clear that the basic motive for business expansion is not just increasing the exports of these companies, but promoting overseas investments and setting up large multinational corporations, which are meant to efficiently boost China's imports rather than its exports. Finally, China put an emphasis on innovation and productivity, which tends to increase its income and thus its consumption power. Innovation and productivity will be helpful in upgrading the structure of China's intraindustrial trade with other Asian economies.
In the field of foreign economic relations, the so-called ''Belt and Road'' strategy, which includes the Silk Road Economic Belt initiative and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, will be one of the main focuses of China's It should be noted that this initiative is not just about finding a substitute for China's exports to US and European markets or expanding the export of China's consumer goods to countries along the Belt and Road. The countries along the Belt and Road are mostly developing and emerging economies that have limited demand for such goods, especially for processed or assembled final products, which are China's traditional primary export products. The implicit target of the initiative seems to be twofold: On the one hand, it will help China get access to the required resources (rather than destinations for its exports), which currently include natural resources such as energy and will soon include more processed or higher-value-added products; on the other hand, it will help China find new markets where it can transfer its excess infrastructure production-because the domestic market for this is shrinking-and to exchange China's portfolio of US treasury bills into more productive investments in the new markets. The completion of the Belt and Road initiative would probably increase China's investment in and export of capital goods (rather than consumer goods) to, and import of both primary goods and consumer goods from, the countries along the Belt and Road. Thus, the Belt and Road will promote both the diversification of the geographical structure and product range of China's trade and the transformation of its own domestic production structure. This is not a return to the traditional export-oriented strategy, but it is in accordance with China's announced target of upgrading its economic structure. The same is the case with regard to China's efforts to establish new international financial institutions, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, with a focus on overseas investment and the transfer of infrastructure production capacity.
If its efforts were to be successful, China would transform smoothly from a regional market for intermediates and parts and components into a main regional market for consumer goods. This would improve the stability and growth of regional production. But things are not easy; uncertainties are always looming and contingency factors will influence the progress of China's domestic and international economic designs.
Future Uncertainties
The most important and influential uncertainties are the domestic ones. First, there is the possibility that the slowdown of growth could turn into a hard landing for the economy, because both real estate prices and corporate profit rates face the risk of decline (Huang 2015) . Second, there are several uncertainties in the financial sector, especially because liberalization reforms and technological innovations are being promoted at the same time. Third, there are still no institutional arrangements on how to deal with local government debt, despite the fact that the fiscal burden is not a very serious problem and is within control in near future. All these are potential threats to the stability of the macroeconomic situation in the coming three to five years. The effects of reforms and structural adjustments might all vanish and give way to an expansive macro policy, in which case China's macroeconomic condition would become less stable.
Here, some long-term factors should also be taken into consideration. First, there is a demographic structure problem that will affect the future capacity and structure of Chinese consumption. Second, a particular problem has always been how to promote innovation and technological progress. Just as Martin Feldstein mentioned, Chinese officials are well aware of the importance of innovation, but they are not clear on how to promote it. Similarly, the relevant firms also lack the incentives and cultural environment for innovation (Wallstreetcn 2015) . Third, because of inertia in economic behaviour, it is difficult to change the main engine of growth from export and government-dominated investment to domestic consumption, nor are the firms that specialize in export and government projects ready to change their business focuses.
In the realm of international economic cooperation, the primary challenge is how to deal with different and separate regional cooperation mechanisms and the different strategies and policy focuses of the major East Asian economies, let alone the complicated and sometimes tense regional political environment.
To sum up, China's future role in the East Asian economy depends largely on its own economic transition and the development of regional cooperation arrangements. The ideal scenario is that China will become a new provider of markets for final consumer goods for Asia and play a real leading role in the regional economy. A worse scenario foresees that China might maintain its status as a platform for regional exports for a longer time, but it would face difficulties because the production capacity for China's export products might grow faster than global demand. The realistic scenario falls in between these two extremes; therefore, in the best interests of the development of both China and Asia as a whole, China should pay more attention to its structural changes along with cooperative and coordinated efforts among the East Asian economies.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
In the changing global environment, it is no surprise that China's role in the Asian economy has experienced changes in the past and will experience further changes in the future. As this article demonstrates, China has changed from a following goose to a regional export platform within the space of the past three decades. Currently, China is arguably going through a phase of multifold transition, and its involvement in regional economic activities has shown signs of changing from a regional assembler to a main regional market for consumer goods produced in the region.
The prospect of China of achieving this new status depends on both the external environment and China's own policy initiatives. As this article argues, the FDI inflows from other East Asian economies played an important role in China's rise as the regional export platform, but they have negative implications for China's import of final consumer goods. As Figure 2 shows, these FDI inflows have already experienced a downturn in recent years, possibly because of both the change in the economic situation and the change in China's policy emphasis. However, this article argues that China's domestic and foreign economic policies are basically going in the right direction. In addition, the results of this study show that the growth of human capital, development of higher education, and improvement in infrastructures are helpful for both China's export of higher technology manufactures and its import of final consumer goods, so China should maintain its policy tradition to improve both higher education and infrastructures.
The Belt and Road initiative will be beneficial for both China and the related countries because it will improve the infrastructures that connect China and these countries, thus promoting China's status as an importer of consumer goods. The last but equally important factor that China's policy-makers should take into consideration is how China will deal with the uncertainties that will determine the destiny of its economic transformation. In fact, the transformation of China's economy and its future role in the regional economy may depend on the trade-off between the government's choice of stability and the economic imperative of efficiency.
Notes 1 In the early 1980s, China was even an oil exporter. 2 The provinces and cities are Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, Shanxi, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hunan, Guanxi, Chongqing, Yunnan, Sha'anxi, Gansu, and Xinjiang.
